

“THE LAWS OF THE FATHERS” VERSUS “THE LAWS OF THE LEAGUE”: XENOPHON ON FEDERALISM

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OMISSION AND ODDITY have long been identified as characteristics of Xenophon's *Hellenica*.¹ There are numerous and prominent examples, as well as corresponding scholarly complaints about unscrupulous inconsistencies and “scandalous silences.”² Xenophon's attitudes towards, and his dealing with, federalism in the Greek world are also often criticized. It is well known that Xenophon—to recall but a few instances—mentions the creation of the Arcadian League only in regard to the turmoil arising from this event (*Hell.* 6.5.6) and does not report the foundation of its federal capital, Megalopolis, at all. He does not bother to mention the Arcadians' appeal to Athens in 370 B.C.E., which the Athenians rejected and so drove the Arcadian Confederacy to the side of Thebes;³ the first Theban invasion into the Peloponnese and the foundation of Messene were to follow. He does not even introduce the great Theban leaders and architects of the Boeotian League, Epaminondas and Pelopidas, until the years of 367/66, and then only under rather disreputable circumstances.⁴ Taken together, these inconsistencies seem to imply that Xenophon failed to acknowledge one of the major developments in his times: the growing prominence of federalism.⁵

This negative impression is bleak. Yet, it is only one side of the coin. As is shown by a brief glance at the information that Xenophon does provide on federalism, without him the history of the early Acarnanian and Aetolian Leagues would have remained virtually a mystery to us. Without Xenophon, our knowledge of both the renaissance of the Thessalian League under Jason and the ascendancy of the Theban-Boeotian League would be fragmentary, at best. It is Xenophon who, in a digression on the Chalcidic League, points to the fact that the Olynthians persuaded their neighbors to share in their laws

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1. E.g., Underhill 1900, *passim*; Westlake 1969; Cawkwell 1976; Higgins 1977, 99–101; Hamilton 1979, 19–20; Cartledge 1987, 62; Tuplin 1993, *passim*; Dillery 1995.

2. E.g., Cawkwell 1973, 57.

3. Cartledge 1987, 63; cf. Buckler 1980a, 70–73.

4. *Hell.* 7.1.33 (Pelopidas), 7.1.41 (Epaminondas); Cawkwell 1972, 255; Westlake 1975.

5. On this phenomenon, see Rhodes 1994; Beck 1997.

and their citizenship, and he thus introduces the term *sympoliteia* (through συμπολιτεύειν) into Greek historiography (*Hell.* 5.2.12). Finally, it is Xenophon who incidentally informs us about the grant of Achaean federal citizenship to the Aetolian polis Calydon (*Hell.* 4.6.1)—an incident depicted as politically trendsetting,⁶ but otherwise unknown.

Xenophon had a good deal of knowledge about these states. In all probability, closeness to Agesilaus made him an intimate connoisseur of federalism and its impact on contemporary politics.⁷ The following examples are more or less arbitrary, but their importance for the development of federalism is revealing. Given his closeness to Sparta throughout his days in Scillus, Xenophon will have been well informed about the King's Peace of 386, when Agesilaus called for the dissolution of the Boeotian League on the grounds of the autonomy clause of the peace.⁸ In 371 he appears to have been present at the Gymnopaïdai festival—an occasion when friendly foreigners were welcome—when news of Leuctra reached Sparta (*Hell.* 6.4.16).⁹ In any case Xenophon will have had a good deal of personal knowledge about the famous Peace Conference in Sparta before Leuctra, when Epaminondas in his celebrated defiance of Agesilaus argued in defense of the legitimacy of the Boeotian League—an incident Xenophon presented in a rather strange light (which I will discuss below). When he was compelled to abandon his estate in Scillus and found refuge in Corinth, Xenophon witnessed both the Peloponnesian riots and the emergence of the Arcadian League—one of the most important federal polities in the Greek world.¹⁰

Xenophon's perception of federalism has never been examined, and any attempt to fill this gap faces a methodological dilemma. Leaving aside the problem of the compatibility of modern federal theories and ancient evidence,¹¹ there is no doubt that the ancient Greek world witnessed the emergence of true federal states.¹² However, no ancient appraisal of federalism as a political principle has survived, and there is good reason to think that no such work was ever written.¹³ Neither Xenophon nor any other author of the classical and hellenistic periods has produced a pamphlet on the

6. Walbank 1970, 18; cf. Merker 1989, 303–4.

7. Select literature on Xenophon's life and his relation to Agesilaus: Delebecque 1957; Breitenbach 1967, 1571–78; Anderson 1974; Higgins 1977; Nickel 1979; Cawkwell 1979; Canfora 1986, 279–308; Cartledge 1987, 56–61 and passim; Tuplin 1993 is also helpful. On friendship with Agesilaus as a source of knowledge of Greek politics, cf. Buckler 1982, 180: "As a friend of Agesilaos and a man of some standing, he enjoyed access to some of the leading political and military figures of the day."

8. Xenophon at Scillus: Diog. Laert. 2.52–53; Xen. *An.* 5.3.7–13; Paus. 5.6.5–6; Delebecque 1957, 169–311; Anderson 1974, 165–66; Breitenbach 1967, 1575–76; Nickel 1979, 7–8; Tuplin 1993, 183–85.

9. Cf. Delebecque 1957, 302; Cartledge 1987, 61; Cawkwell 1976, 63; foreigners at the Gymnopaïdai: Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.61.

10. Xenophon in Corinth: Diog. Laert. 2.53; Delebecque 1957, 312–34; Anderson 1974, 192–93; Breitenbach 1967, 1576; Cartledge 1987, 61. The circumstances of his flight from Scillus are obscure: Tuplin 1993, p. 31, nn. 72, 73. Again, the stay at Corinth favored the gain of firsthand knowledge of Greek politics: Buckler 1980a, 263.

11. On this, see Beck 1997, 18–19.

12. Cf. Walbank 1976–77, 27–51; contra Giovannini (1971), who denied the existence of federalism in Greece.

13. Walbank 1970, 14.

federal principle. Greek federalism desperately lacks contemporary analysis. The author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (19 Chambers) offers, as is well known, a detailed description of the actual functioning of the Boeotian League in the early years of the Corinthian War. He does not, however, provide a theoretical discussion on, or conceptualization of, federalism. As for political thought, the most important sources are Aristotle and Polybius, yet both refrain from treating federalism as an independent subject. Aristotle's school produced empirical studies on the constitutions of several federal states, which seems to imply that he well understood the political practice of federalism. Unfortunately, none of these treatises has been preserved, so it is difficult to estimate the depth of Aristotle's analysis. Polybius, the writer from whom an account of federal states might be most expected, focuses on the history and polity of the Achaean League, yet he does not elaborate on federalism in general. The information available from either author mainly derives from the passages of comparison between federal state (*ethnos* or *koinon*) and city-state (*polis*)—the first being determined only in its relation to the latter.¹⁴

Xenophon is no exception to this. His political ideas center on virtue and its realization in the (ideal) state. The paradigmatic (Greek) community is—quite naturally—the (small) polis.¹⁵ *Arete* of the citizens is achieved rather by the excellence of the man (or men) who rules (or rule) the state than through laws, government, and administration.¹⁶ Political structures therefore are not treated, and if they are, they are treated in this teleological sense.¹⁷ Yet, the narrative of the *Hellenica* does to a large extent consist of the actual politics of federal states. Here lies a fundamental difference between Xenophon and Thucydides. Whether Xenophon thought of his work as “Thucydidean” or not,¹⁸ the *Hellenica* is by no means polis-centered. Deliberate stress on the polis as the genuine (Greek) state, and elevation of its selfish interests—the intellectual backbone of Thucydides' history—are present in the *Hellenica*, but they are not monolithically predominant. It is telling that only about 5 percent of Thucydides' text involves (Greek) states

14. The decisive passages are Arist. *Pol.* 1261a 22–31 and Polyb. 2.37.9–38.9; for an interpretation, see Beck 1997, 13–18 (including further literature). Aristotle's descriptions of federal governments: frags. 473, 483–84, 495, 497–98 (Rose). On the problem of federal thought and theory in antiquity cf. Larsen 1968, xi–xii; Buckler 1994, 107–16; Bearzot 1994, 174–79; Funke 1998.

15. See Dillery 1995, 130–38, on the grounds of Xenophon's *laudatio* of Phlius (*Hell.* 7.2.1–3.1). The polis is also idealized in *An.* 5.6.15–16 (with Dillery 1995, 41–42).

16. This motive is present in the *Cyropaedia* and the *Hiero*. On Xenophon's political ideas see Delebecque 1957, *passim*; Anderson 1974, 40–45; Nickel 1979, 18–27; Dillery 1995, 41–98; Jaeger 1955, 226–54; Weathers 1954, 317–21, 330.

17. The most evident example is *The State of the Lacedaemonians*—unlike Aristotle's *politeiai* not confined to the mere constitution of the Lacedaemonians (in the narrow sense of its institutions and laws), but embracing the entire social and political frame of the “Spartan way of life” (in a broader scope of *politeia*). The didactic element of *Lacedaimonion Politeia* thus is to illuminate Spartan virtue as enabled by the laws of Lycurgus; see Rebenich 1998, 14–35.

18. There is a long scholarly debate on the question whether Xenophon continued the work of Thucydides intellectually and/or textually, starting with Niebuhr 1828, 464–68. The details need not concern us here; see Underhill 1900, Introduction § 1; Higgins 1977, 99–127 (and *passim*); Nickel 1979, 86–87; Anderson 1974, 61–64 (and *passim*); Delebecque 1957, 39–53; Breitenbach 1967, 1669–80; Westlake 1969, 204; Dillery 1995, 9–11; Tuplin 1993, 36–41 (and *passim*); Cartledge 1987, 62; Soulis 1972 (in most parts untenable); Gray 1989, 1–9; Hornblower 1994, 29–31.

that are not poleis, while some 20 percent of the *Hellenica* concerns events that were dominated by federal states.

What did Xenophon think about these states? How did he (if he did at all) perceive the federal principle? Was Xenophon, a man of traditional values and political concepts, hostile towards federalism?¹⁹ To answer these questions it is necessary to embark on Xenophon's presentation of federalism in the wider context of his narrative. Since information is scattered, and there is no coherent treatment of the subject, Xenophon's federal ideas must be extrapolated from his narrative. The first part of this paper sets out to collect these data in order to provide a general picture of how Xenophon portrays the characteristics of federal states. A key to the understanding of federalism is the question of the division of political power between federal center and local government. In any federal union, member-states are obliged to delegate genuine *praerogativa* to the central government, while at the same time they enjoy a certain degree of autonomy. Self-government and autonomy are the key issues in federal affairs. *Autonomia*, in general, is the central topic in long sections of *Hellenica* 5–6, and we shall turn to Xenophon's views on this in the second part of this paper. Both aspects, Xenophon's portrayal of federalism and his thoughts on *autonomia*, will be crucial to the final step of the analysis (part III), in which Xenophon's method and agenda when arguing on the interaction of autonomy and federalism will be observed. By investigating Xenophon's conceptualization of federalism, my paper will shed some light on Greek federal thought and theory in the fifth and fourth centuries (part IV).

I

The theme of the *Hellenica* is interstate relations in the years from the Peloponnesian War to the battle of Mantinea. Xenophon focuses on foreign policy and—to a lesser extent—internal strife.²⁰ Unlike the excursus in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (19) on representative government in Boeotia, constitutional arrangements are rarely explained, either in a single polis or in a federal state. Thus, in the year 366, Xenophon first mentions the federal assembly of the Arcadian League, the *myrioi*, without any reference to its creation, composition or constitutional powers (*Hell.* 7.4.2). The same is true for the *Arkadikon* in general. While drawing a vivid picture of the internal struggle within the league (*Hell.* 7.4.33–40), there is no explanation of its constitutional framework.²¹ It is only incidentally that the reader is informed that the *archontes* of the *Arkadikon*, the *damiourgoi*, underwent the federal examination of their accounts on expiry of their office (*Hell.* 7.4.34)—an aperçu that is crucial to the understanding of the escalation of the Arcadian civil war.²² Likewise in 389, when Xenophon refers to the federal government of Acarnania in Stratus (*Hell.* 4.6.4; cf. 4.7.1). The context

19. As has been suggested by Bearzot (1994, 176–77).

20. Cf. Tuplin 1993, 41. On the function of the exceptionally disproportionate digression on the "Thirty" (2.3.11–4.43) see Tuplin 1993, 43–47; Dillery 1995, 138–63.

21. Apart from the brief note 6.5.6: see below.

22. On the *damiourgoi* of the Arcadians see Beck 1997, 81; Dusanic 1970, 341; Trampedach 1994, 28.

leaves no doubt that the *koinon* was constitutionally in a position to negotiate with foreign powers on behalf of all Acarnanians; from Xenophon's description, however, it remains unclear how this *koinon* worked in detail and how the member-states participated in shaping the league's policy.²³ One final (and much debated) example for this treatment of constitutional matters should be added. Reporting the murder of Euphron, tyrant of Sicyon, in Thebes, Xenophon says that he was assassinated in a meeting of a *boule* on the *Kadmeia*. The assassins were immediately put on trial before another *boule* (7.3.5)—in all probability a body different from the one that witnessed the bloodshed. The incident has led to some discussion among modern scholars about the jurisdiction of the Boeotian League, especially whether there existed both local and federal lawcourts, each side arguing with Xenophon.²⁴

In all these instances it would be unfair, if not wrong, to complain about Xenophontean shortcomings. Lack of research or "artistic desire," as has been suggested,²⁵ are inapplicable categories. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case: it is striking that Xenophon—implicitly—offers a good deal of information on federalism, but simply does not elaborate in further detail. Such reticence is not only well in line with Xenophon's treatment of constitutional matters, but also with the tendency in Greek historiography of the fifth and fourth centuries to show a lack of interest in elaborating on polis and federal constitutions in general. Omissions of this kind are not a Xenophontean particularity, but reflect the familiarities of his readers.

Throughout the *Hellenica*, federal states are perceived and presented as unified. They are referred to by their tribal ethnics (e.g., οἱ Ἀχαιοί, οἱ Βοιωτοί, οἱ Χαλκιδεῖς); the more technical term τὸ κοινόν, the official designation of federal states in Xenophon's days,²⁶ is used but twice, for the Acarnanian and Arcadian Leagues (*Hell.* 4.6.4; 7.5.1).²⁷ As a member of a symmarchy such as the Peloponnesian League, a federal state speaks with one voice in the allied *synhedrion* (esp. 4.6.2).²⁸ Federal states are made up of different member-states—poleis, tribes, or both—but these are seldom mentioned, and then only under circumstances of crisis. Federal armies are recruited from the contingents of the member-states (*Hell.* 5.2.13–14, 6.5.12). In turn, fighting a league also means fighting its individual members (*Hell.* 4.6.13).

It is tempting to interpret this appearance of federal states as a result of military necessity and to argue that federal unions were formed primarily for the conduct of military campaigns. In fact, the *Hellenica* provides ample evidence for this, most notably in Xenophon's account of the Thessalian

23. Acarnanian League: Beck 1997, 31–43 (with literature). On Agesilaus' embassy to the *koinon* of the Acarnanians in 389, see also Landgraf and Schmidt 1996, 105–12; Freitag 2000, 46–49.

24. For a discussion of the different attitudes cf. Jehne 1999, 328–44; Buckler 2000, 431–46.

25. Higgins 1977, pp. 174–75, n. 136.

26. τὸ κοινόν is used in official records such as decrees and treaties of federal states in the fourth century: Beck 1997, 165–66.

27. The Arcadian League is also referred to as τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν: 6.5.11–12, 22; 7.1.38; 4.12, 33. Thucydides does not use τὸ κοινόν in this sense.

28. See Larsen 1953, 810–11; de Ste. Croix 1972, 123–24 and app. XVII, sect. C, § 1.

League under Jason: To win the support of Polydamas of Pharsalus for his plan to reestablish the Thessalian *tageia* (*Hell.* 6.1.5–12), the argument that Jason puts forward in favor of the unification of Thessaly is *Machtpolitik*. Polydamas may choose whether to submit to Jason and support his election as *tagos*, or to offer resistance and be confronted with the tyrant's superior forces. In either case, the military might of a unified Thessaly—some 6,000 *hippeis* and up to 10,000 hoplites (*Hell.* 6.1.8)—was soon to prevail, not over “some small islets” (*Hell.* 6.1.12), but over all of northern and central Greece. Polydamas, *proxenos* of the Spartans, reports these dangers to the Spartan Assembly and appeals for help against the tyrant. Doing so, he predicts that the union of the Thessalian cities rests on the force of Jason's mercenaries rather than on political arrangements. As soon as a Spartan army large enough appears in Thessaly, the cities will revolt and desert Jason (*Hell.* 6.1.14). Xenophon's focus when portraying the Thessalian federal state is thus altogether on military force. The intentions and interests of the Thessalian League are reduced to the accumulation of the tyrant's power, which presents a severe danger to both the free cities of Thessaly and, sooner or later, also to Spartan interests in central Greece.²⁹

This does not mean that the conduct of warfare was the only or even the decisive argument for federal unions. In his account of the year 382, Xenophon relates that the cities of Acanthus and Apollonia sent embassies to Sparta to appeal for help against the growing power of the Chalcidic League. Again (and quite naturally), the leading member of the embassy, Cleigenes of Acanthus, points to the military dangers arising from Olynthus' expansion (*Hell.* 5.2.12–13, 15–17).³⁰ Like Polydamas, Cleigenes suggests that the cities will desert the Olynthians as soon as they see a force supporting their cause, yet he makes the important restriction that this is only true of the *poleis* “who share in the league unwillingly” (*Hell.* 5.2.18). This raises the question of the league's voluntary members.

The character assigned to the Chalcidic League by Xenophon differs greatly from his ruthless picture of Thessaly. In the first place, Xenophon makes Cleigenes argue that the Olynthians attached to themselves some of the Chalcidic cities “with the provision that all should live under the same laws and be fellow citizens” (*Hell.* 5.2.12); later the Olynthians started to adopt larger and more distant *poleis*, to the point at which Acanthus and Apollonia are under threat of being incorporated in the league. The Acanthians and Apollonians, alas, “desire to live under the laws of [their] fathers and to be citizens of [their] own city”; but if the Spartans turned down their appeal, they would be “forced to be united” with the Olynthians (*Hell.* 5.2.14). This prospect was horrifying to the citizens of both *poleis*, despite the fact that the members of the league “become closely connected by reciprocal rights of intermarriage and of property” (*Hell.* 5.2.19).

29. This view is corroborated by Jason's announcement that he was going to subdue the perioikic communities of Thessaly as soon as he had been established as *tagos* (*Hell.* 6.1.9). On the predominance of military aspects, cf. Krafft 1967, 103–33, esp. 119; Sprawski 1999, 71–75.

30. Cleigenes' opening words include that *πρᾶγμα μέγα φούμενον ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι* (*Hell.* 5.2.12). The military resources of the Chalcidic League included possibly up to 8,000 hoplites (800 as in 5.2.14 is impossible [Beck 1997, p. 173, n. 31]).

Xenophon's lengthy excursus on the polity of the Chalcidic League provides valuable information on federalism, which leaves the reader to think that the success of the Olynthians in expanding their confederacy was due not only to military force, but also to political skill. Since the confederacy decreed a series of federal rights, such as *enktesis* and *epigameia*, the citizens of the *koinon* enjoyed both commercial and private privileges in all member-states. As a result of this, their union was to become even closer in the future—a point strongly acknowledged. These aspects—protection and profit—must have been attractive to many cities. The most striking point, however, was political power: since the Olynthians granted federal citizenship to new members and apparently offered a share in the political power of the central government,³¹ their policy could not be dismissed as exclusively violent.

Cleigenes, speaking on behalf of the opponents of the league, was in the difficult position of condemning these very innovations. His arguments are lodged in a thoroughly refined political vocabulary:

The federalists do not take offense at the fact that the Olynthians “τῶν πόλεων προσ-
γάγοντο ἐφ’ ᾧ τε νόμοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι καὶ συμπολιτεύειν.” [5.2.12]

“Alas we” (the people of Acanthus and Apollonia), Cleigenes stresses, “βουλόμεθα μὲν
τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι καὶ αὐτοπολῖται εἶναι.” [5.2.14]

Against a common share of political life, highlighted by the neologism *συμπολιτεύειν*, Cleigenes holds that his fellow citizens wish to live under their own laws and to be citizens of their own city. The Acanthians desire *αὐτοπολῖται εἶναι*—an *hapax legomenon* that urges the point that what the Acanthians want is the exact opposite of *συμπολιτεύειν*. Alluding to moral categories such as ancestral customs and “the laws of the fathers,” Cleigenes argues against the federal arrangements of the Chalcidic order, which are harmful to the traditional values of the polis.³² Using such political metaphor, he insinuates that federalism was dangerous, if not hostile, to the ancestral authorities. However, it is also conceded that many cities were favoring the league and that they regarded *sympoliteia* as an attractive alternative to *autopoliteia*. They were aware that being fellow citizens beyond the single polis meant the replacement or, better, the displacement of exclusive political powers of the polis by federal authorities. To them this disadvantage—if it was a disadvantage at all—was counterbalanced by the advantages of sympathy.

This political ambiguity of two sets of authorities, polis and *koinon*, raises the question of competence and sovereignty.³³ From a minimalist perspective, the working of a federal state depends on the willingness of its member-states to accept (and at times obey) decisions of the central government, as long as the league's policy is concerned. Xenophon was well acquainted with this. In his account of the *stasis* in Tegea in 371/70, he identifies the party of Callibius and Proxenus as protagonists favoring the

31. Cf. Beck 1997, 159–58; Larsen 1968, 75–78; Zahrt 1971, 80–90.

32. Cf. Bearzot 1994, 174–79, esp. 178.

33. On sovereignty in Greek antiquity, see Davies 1994, 51–66.

foundation of the Arcadian League. He continues that their political program included the provision that “whatever measure was carried in the common assembly should be binding on the several cities as well” (ὅ τι νικῶν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων). But the followers of Stasippus made it their policy “to leave their city undisturbed” and—note the analogy to the speech of Cleigenes—“to live under the laws of their fathers” (τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι, *Hell.* 6.5.6).³⁴ Here Xenophon is as clear as he can be. He realizes that any attempt to establish a federal state implies some sort of vertical separation of political power, since decisions of the member cities are to a certain degree subordinate to laws of the common assembly. To put it the other way around: To Xenophon federal decrees quite naturally prevail over the legislation of the single polis. This logically leads to a loss of political autonomy of the member-poleis, and this is what the opponents of federalism, from Acanthus to Arcadia, refuse to accept. Their point is autonomy.

II

With the provision of the King’s Peace “that the Greek cities outside Asia, small and great, were to be autonomous” (*Hell.* 5.1.31),³⁵ *autonomia* was heralded as the basic principle of the polis. The concept might have implied a series of legal criteria, such as the freedom from harmosts, garrisons, tribute, and, most notably, the right to vote for one’s own laws and customs.³⁶ Technically, however, the Common Peace of 386 refrained from a detailed definition of *autonomia*, which meant that autonomy—on the grounds of the King’s Peace—was not altogether unambiguous.³⁷ *Autonomia* was no juridically defined condition, but a negative concept: its absence was easier to be identified than its positive definition.³⁸ Given this nature of *autonomia*, it is impossible to decide whether the federal principle was *eo ipso* in contradiction to the autonomy clause of the King’s Peace. While the implementation of the autonomy clause thus was left open by the Peace itself, the Spartans established a precedent, which prevailed as the *modus operandi*: when proclaiming that the Boeotian League meant an infringement upon the autonomy of the Boeotian poleis, Agesilaus interpreted *autonomia* as prohibiting states from including more than one polis. Xenophon leaves no doubt that the Spartans for long desired to break up the Boeotian Confederacy, and he even alludes to Agesilaus’ personal hatred for Thebes as the motive for the dissolution (*Hell.* 5.1.33, 36). Yet Sparta’s claim on Thebes “to leave the Boeotian poleis independent” (*Hell.* 5.1.33; cf. 4.8.15) does not seem to have

34. On the Tegeatan *stasis*, see Gehrke 1985, 154–55.

35. Cf. Diod. Sic. 14.110.3.

36. *JG* 2²43, 1.20–23 gives these criteria; cf. Ostwald 1982, 48; Whitehead 1993, 324.

37. See Urban 1991, 110; Jehne 1994, 37–44 (contra Cawkwell 1981, 72). This appears to have been true for the following Common Peaces as well; cf. Hansen 1995a, 38–43. The King’s Peace did not even stipulate Sparta’s *prostasia* of it. Instead, the Spartans acquired the *prostasia* by concrete action on behalf of the peace (Urban 1991, 116–18).

38. Cf. Jehne 1994, 272; Ostwald 1982, 41–46; and esp. Raaflaub 1985, 201–2. Hansen (1995a, 34) argues for a more juridical definition, notably for the incompatibility of *autonomia* and paying tribute, but see Jehne 1994, p. 273, n. 28 contra.

met any serious opposition in 386 (Thebes notwithstanding). The dissolution was apparently regarded as legitimate action (*Hell.* 5.1.32–33).³⁹ Again, it must be stressed that the Boeotian federal venture was not *automatically* in contradiction to the King's Peace. It was so because its *present state* was considered to be an infringement of autonomy.⁴⁰ The considerable number of federal states, such as the Phocians, Achaeans, Acarnanians, Aetolians, to mention but a few, remained literally untouched by the autonomy clause.

It is well known that, in the aftermath of the King's Peace, Sparta used—or rather abused—the autonomy clause for intervening in the internal affairs of her enemies and was in turn regarded as traitor to autonomy herself.⁴¹ It suffices to recall Sparta's assaults upon Mantinea, Phlius, and Thebes. Interestingly enough, Xenophon's narrative, starting with the King's Peace, reveals an inherently ambivalent hidden agenda on the question of autonomy. More than any other part of the *Hellenica*, the composition of Books 5–6 is determined by long sets of speeches in the Spartan assembly, in which Xenophon discusses the motives and aims of Sparta's autonomy policy. The first two of these, by Cleigenes of Acanthus (*Hell.* 5.2.11–19) and Polydamas of Pharsalus (*Hell.* 6.1.4–16), have been examined above. Both speakers reported the emergence of a federal state, and both speakers urged the Spartans not to allow their respective cities to be incorporated in this league. Cleigenes does not plead *expressis verbis* that the Chalcidic League was a violation of the autonomy clause of the King's Peace, but his reference to the genuine laws and customs of Acanthus (*Hell.* 5.2.14) reveals that the question of *autonomia* was the central point.⁴² Polydamas' speech pays no attention to whether the Thessalian cities suffered a lack of autonomy or not, evidently because this was beyond questioning. Jason's rule is portrayed as tyranny, which makes any argument on *autonomia* superfluous.⁴³

A third set of speeches needs to be examined. In his description of the Common Peace of 371 at Sparta, Xenophon introduces three Athenian ambassadors—Callias, Autocles, and Callistratus—who one after the other

39. Jehne 1994, p. 37, n. 39; Cartledge 1987, 370; Ryder 1965, 31–36; Seager 1974, 38–39.

40. There is recent scholarly debate on this point. Hansen (1995b, 35) thinks that the Boeotian League was *eo ipso* a breach of the autonomy clause (mainly on the grounds of his definition of *autonomia*); contra Keen (1996, 113–25), who thinks that the Thebans considered the Boeotian poleis fully autonomous, both in 386 and 371; in response, see Hansen 1996, 128–29, arguing that the dissolution of 386 was regarded as a legitimate implementation of the King's Peace. Keen's point is difficult to accept, since it is impossible to see how cities destroyed by the Thebans could be seriously regarded as autonomous: Plataea in 427 and 373, Thespieae ca. 373/72; see Tuplin 1986, 321–41. Hansen's view is equally problematic. The dissolution of the Boeotian League in 386 seems to have been welcomed by many Boeotians (and other Greek states), because of Thebes' aggressive policy against individual member-states.

41. *JG* 2².43.7–12; see Cawkwell 1976, 62–84; Hornblower 1991, 202–22; Hamilton 1997, 53–55; Seager 1994, 156–63.

42. Tuplin (1993, 96) believes that the passage on *autopoliteia* of Acanthus and Apollonia “if anything draws attention to Sparta's lack of interest in such matters.” I find this difficult to believe, since Cleigenes continues to compare the situation in the north with the Boeotian case, in which the Spartans had produced a precedent (*Hell.* 5.2.16). Again *autonomia* is not mentioned explicitly, but it was the publicly alleged (and accepted) argument for the dissolution of the Boeotian League; cf. also Beck 1997, 241; Jehne 1994, 50–51.

43. *Hell.* 6.4.32 explicitly puts forward the tyranny *topos*, which is also present in 6.1.12, when Jason alludes to making Greece ὑπὲρκοος; cf. Tuplin 1993, 120; Krafft 1967, 118–19; Sprawski 1999, 76–78; Mandel 1980, 47–77.

outline the Athenian conditions for the acceptance of the treaty.⁴⁴ Callias, the first speaker and *proxenos* of the Lacedaemonians, emphasizes Athenian displeasure with Theban policy in Boeotia; like the Spartans, the Athenians condemn the destruction of Thespieae and Plataea; given their common hostility towards Thebes, Athens and Sparta should be friends (*Hell.* 6.3.4–6). The next speaker, Autocles, warns that he has to say unpleasant things, but that only by resolving grievances can both sides establish a lasting friendship. The Spartans always claim that the cities must be autonomous; but the Spartans themselves are “the greatest obstacle in the way of their independence” (*Hell.* 6.3.7). The primary cause for the war previously fought was their headstrong policy on autonomy, for when the Thebans did not allow any one of their cities either to rule itself, or even “to live under whatever laws it chose” (οἷς ἂν βούληται νόμοις χρῆσθαι), they would not be acting “in accordance with the King’s writing; but when you [the Spartans] had seized the *Kadmeia*, you did not permit even the Thebans themselves to be autonomous” (*Hell.* 6.3.9). He finishes by stressing that observance of the autonomy clause of the King’s Peace is a *conditio sine qua non* for Athenian friendship.⁴⁵ Xenophon observes that these grievances caused silences among the audience (*Hell.* 6.3.10). Callistratus, the final speaker, returns to Callias’ proposal of mutual friendship, and also alludes to discontent with Thebes. Like Autocles, he disapproves of Sparta’s seizure of the Theban *Kadmeia* as a breach of the King’s Peace. It is desirable for both sides to become reconciled, yet, from the Athenian perspective, this is altogether impossible, unless the Spartans are willing to act on the grounds of the autonomy clause (*Hell.* 6.3.10–17).

It has been noted that this trilogy of speeches is part of one of the key topics of this portion of the *Hellenica*, that is, the Athenian-Spartan rapprochement before Leuctra. The major obstacle to this was Sparta’s policy on autonomy.⁴⁶ The Spartans refrained from any justification against the charges of the Athenian embassy. Instead, Xenophon confirms that they were prepared to acknowledge their mistakes, thinking that all three orators spoke well (*Hell.* 6.3.18). Reason thus prevailed over *Machtpolitik*. The Spartans voted to accept the treaty, including the provisions that their harlots should be withdrawn from the cities, their armies be disbanded, and the cities be left autonomous (*Hell.* 6.3.18). What followed is too well known to be laid out in detail again. The Spartans took the oath for themselves and their allies,⁴⁷ the Athenians and their allies swore separately, city by city, and the Thebans also signed their names among the cities that had sworn (hence as “Thebans”). The following day, Xenophon continues, their ambassadors (without any reference to their identity) demanded that their signature be changed to “Boeotians,” a demand that was rejected by Agesi-

44. *Hell.* 6.3.4–17. On this trilogy see Buckler 1982, 182–83, 198–99; Gray 1989, 123–32; Soulis 1972, 147–56; Tuplin 1993, 102–10.

45. Buckler (1982, p. 183, n. 4) points out that Autocles’ speech is by no means pro-Theban, as is sometimes believed. Its demand for autonomy is well in line with the following speech of Callistratus, “although it obviously takes a stiffer line with the Spartans”; cf. Tuplin 1993, 103, 108–9.

46. See Buckler 1982, 183.

47. Buckler (1980a, 51–52) has convincingly argued that the Spartans were authorized by their allies to take the oaths on behalf of the Peloponnesian League.

laus; if the Thebans instead wished not to be included, he, Agesilaus, would strike their names from the document. Since neither side was prepared to give in, the peace was concluded without the Thebans (*Hell.* 6.3.19).⁴⁸

There are several alternative versions, most eminently by Plutarch, whose *Life of Agesilaus* largely derives from Xenophon, but also contains much beyond.⁴⁹ Plutarch relates a speech of Epaminondas, in which he put forward the very grievances Autocles and Callistratus had presented the day before. When Agesilaus, accordingly, asked him whether he considered it justice that the Boeotian cities should be autonomous from Thebes, Epaminondas boldly inquired whether he, Agesilaus, thought it justice for the cities of Laconia to be independent of Sparta. Agesilaus again wrathfully demanded of Epaminondas whether he intended to make the Boeotian poleis independent, while Epaminondas made the counterdemand that Agesilaus give autonomy to the perioikic cities of Laconia and Messenia (Plut. *Ages.* 27–28).

The Koine Eirene of 371 has been investigated many times,⁵⁰ which allows us to turn immediately to Xenophon's agenda on autonomy. It is striking that Xenophon makes much of the congress, compared to other peace conferences. The instance is one of the few for which Xenophon gives formal *orationes rectae*, let alone a trilogy.⁵¹ This is even more impressive, since Xenophon wholly suppresses the role of Epaminondas and passes over his speech in silence—evidently to spare Agesilaus the humiliation of being outsmarted.⁵² The main grievance put forward by the Athenian embassy is the seizure of the Theban *Kadmeia*. Yet, this breach of the autonomy clause is only the most prominent example of Spartan injustices. Beyond this example in particular, the trilogy of Athenian speeches is a censure of Sparta's policy in general.⁵³ Xenophon's narrative indicates that he approved of the Athenian-Spartan rapprochement in 371—hence the thorough composition of the Peace and the detailed account of the Athenian embassy, which brought this about. The major obstacle was Sparta's policy on autonomy.⁵⁴

48. *Hell.* 6.3.20 does not state explicitly that the peace was concluded without Thebes. Only in Diod. Sic. 15.38.3, 50.4, and 51.1 are the Thebans ἑκσπονδοί (cf. Plut. *Ages.* 28). In any case the Thebans could have been branded as traitors to peace, unless they allowed the Boeotian cities to take the oaths individually.

49. Cf. D. R. Shipley 1997, 24, 46–55. For other versions see Paus. 9.13.2; Nep. *Epam.* 6.4; Diod. Sic. 15.38.3, 15.50.4 (with Lauffer 1959, 315–48).

50. Cartledge 1987, 307; Buckler 1980a, 49–55; Tuplin 1993, endnote 13 (with regard to the different versions of Epaminondas' appearance); Seager 1974, 50–53; Ryder 1965, 58–78; and, most recently, Jehne 1994, 65–74.

51. Gray 1989, 123–24.

52. Cf. Jehne 1994, 72; Cawkwell 1972, 255.

53. Most prominently in Autocles' speech, who also denounces Spartan dekarchies and the obligation of Sparta's allies "to follow wherever the Lacedaemonians might lead" as breaches of *autonomia* (*Hell.* 6.3.8).

54. See Buckler 1982, 182–84, 198; cf. Higgins 1977, 107–8 (on Autocles). Tuplin (1993, 110) is skeptical that rapprochement was on the agenda and goes as far as to claim that the trilogy of speeches leaves the reader "with some reason for suspecting that if there is actually to be any question of rapprochement it is likely to be tainted by a continuing Athenian [*sic*] desire *πλεονεκτεῖν*." It should not be denied, to be sure, that the Athenian embassy to a certain degree anticipates what was to come, namely a shift of *prostasia* from Sparta to Athens after Leuctra. But, was this not due rather to Spartan *πλεονεξία*? Tuplin detects satirical tones and/or novelties in each and every speech (Callias: 105; Autocles: 108; Callistratus: 109–10), yet these are (albeit skilful) over-interpretations (on this general danger see Dillery 1995, 195). It is impossible

Xenophon's agenda on *autonomia* in Books 5–6 is his criticism of Sparta for violating the autonomy clause of the King's Peace. This criticism can be traced back from Leuctra to the King's Peace: in 385 or 384, only a year or so after the Peace, Xenophon exposes Sparta's political aims as "to punish those of their allies who had formerly opposed them" and "to ensure that it was no longer possible for them to be distrusted" (*Hell.* 5.2.1)—no word about *autonomia*, to be sure. In 382, he harshly condemns the seizure of the Theban *Kadmeia* as *adikia*, which Xenophon believes was avenged by the gods at Leuctra (5.4.1; cf. 6.4.3, 23).⁵⁵ When his narrative arrives at the Peace of 371, Xenophon is, as the peculiar line of his argument suggests, clearly coldhearted about, if not even discontented with, Sparta's policy, which for the moment seemed to prevent reconciliation with Athens. This criticism, in turn, reveals that Xenophon regarded *autonomia* as an important and vital feature of the polis. Since *autonomia* is presented in the light of ancestral customs and the "laws of the fathers," it is also of traditional value, which all the more adds to its legitimacy. Xenophon does not provide the reader with a precise definition of autonomy. Yet, his narrative does indicate that independence and self-government—literally *autonomia*—of the polis were central concepts of his political thought.

III

The rigid definition of *autonomia* as proclaimed in 386 was framed (and put into action) by the leading figure of Spartan politics, Agesilaus. The first state to be made an object lesson for past disloyalty was Mantinea—a genuine polis, the legitimacy of which had been recognized when the Spartans had accepted Mantinea's oaths at the King's Peace. When Mantinea was called upon to dioikize (as well as to abolish democracy and pull down the walls), the violation of autonomy rested with Sparta rather than with the synoikism of Mantinea as such.⁵⁶ The assault on the city was something of an embarrassment to the Spartans, for which they were unable to present sound reasons.

In Xenophon's account of the Mantinea affair Agesilaus' role is obscured, since the king is reported to have requested the Spartans to be relieved from command on the spurious ground that the polis of the Mantineians "had rendered his father Archidamus many services in the wars against Messene" (*Hell.* 5.2.3). The command was hence transferred to king Agesipolis. Agesilaus' reason for this refusal has been found suspect by modern scholars; indeed, Xenophon shows "poker-faced reserve,"⁵⁷ presumably to

to tell how many readers will have actually grasped the subtle messages Tuplin has detected (as he himself sees, 105), but, given the prominent breaches of the autonomy clause committed by Sparta (which the Spartans were even prepared to admit), I tend to think that virtually nobody will have suspected that the major obstacle to reconciliation was Athens.

55. On Xenophon's view of this, cf. also Buckler 1980b; Dillery 1995, 175–94 (with regard to "the divine").

56. Cf. *Hell.* 5.2.1–7; Diod. Sic. 15.5.1–5. For the details see Dillery 1995, 207–8; Cartledge 1987, 261; Tuplin 1993, 87–90.

57. Cawkwell 1976, 64.

disguise that Agesilaus tried to undermine the prestige of his co-king in this instance.⁵⁸ This method of presenting Agesilaus in a favorable light, either through odd *apologia* (as in 385) or through omission (as in 371), is a central thread in Xenophon's narration on the Spartan hegemony. Again, it embraces the period from the King's Peace to Leuctra.

The Spartan seizure of the *Kadmeia* is thus ascribed to a private arrangement between Phoebidas and the Theban *polemarchos* Leontiades, while Agesilaus' share is reduced to asking whether Phoebidas had acted "in the best interest of the state" (*Hell.* 5.2.28, 32).⁵⁹ Plutarch, again, says what Xenophon deliberately obfuscates, namely that Agesilaus was hand in glove with Phoebidas' action from the start and rescued him from punishment, and that he was responsible for maintaining the garrison in the *Kadmeia*.⁶⁰ As for the Olynthian War, Xenophon does not give an explicit justification for the Chalcidic campaign of 382 (though, as we have seen, *autonomia* must have been the argument prevailing); nor does he name the figures who were to be held responsible for the long, costly, and exhausting expedition.⁶¹ Instead, his narrative focuses on the allies' eagerness to send troops, and thus implicitly vests the allies of the Lacedaemonians with the responsibility for the Olynthian campaign (*Hell.* 5.2.20). Diodorus' and Xenophon's accounts of this affair usefully complement each other, and Diodorus (drawing upon Ephorus)⁶² spells out what Xenophon chose to pass over, namely that the prime mover for the war against the Chalcidic League was Agesilaus.⁶³ In other instances, the political motives of Agesilaus are equally suspect. The reason for his expedition against Phlius in 381 was, according to Xenophon, *philetairia*, the support of supporters, who had been exiled on account of their sympathy with the Lacedaemonians. In the same spirit, the king led an assault against the (embryo-)Boeotian League in 378 (*Xen. Ages.* 2.21–22).⁶⁴ Repatriation of exiles (not *autonomia*) is also pretended to be the cause for Agesilaus' campaign against the emerging Arcadian federal state in 370 (*Hell.* 6.5.10; cf. *Diod. Sic.* 15.59.4).

Xenophon obviously refrained from presenting the king as hostile towards federal states. Instead, he disguised Agesilaus' role by shifting his motives from harsh *autonomia* to moral *apologia*. Whenever Xenophon mentions the king's actual motives, his actions against federal states are

58. Agesipolis and his father Pausanias were highly regarded by the Arcadians: *Hell.* 5.2.6; cf. also Dillery 1995, 208; Cawkwell 1976, 76; Cartledge 1987, 260; Rice 1974, 164–82.

59. Cf. *Diod. Sic.* 15.20.2; *Nep. Pel.* 2–3; Androtion *FGH* 324 F 50; Dillery 1995, 196; Cartledge 1987, 296–98; Beck 1997, 242; Jehne 1994, 51–52; Buckler 1980b, 179–85.

60. *Plut. Ages.* 23, cf. *Pel.* 6; *Mor.* 576a–577d. In a similar way, Xenophon puts up a smoke-screen on the Sphodrias affair: *Hell.* 5.4.20–33; yet cf. *Plut. Ages.* 24, *Pel.* 14; Callisthenes *FGH* 124 F 9; see Cartledge 1987, 136–38; de Ste. Croix 1972, 134–36; Urban 1991, 165–66; Rice 1975, 95–130.

61. For the details see Zahrt 1971, 91–97.

62. See now Stylianou 1998, 49–132.

63. *Diod. Sic.* 15.19.2–3; cf. Cartledge 1987, 270–71.

64. In the *Hellenica* Agesilaus first refused to campaign against Thebes, on the pretext "that it was more than 40 years since he had come of military age"; the true motive, as added by Xenophon (5.4.13), was that he well knew that otherwise the people would say ὅπως βοηθήσει τοῖς τυράννοις (sc. the Theban supporters of Phoebidas). The Boeotian command was conferred upon the other—inexperienced—king, Cleombrotus, whom Agesilaus succeeded later in 378, when begged by the people to do so (5.4.35); cf. Cartledge 1987, 229–32.

justified on the grounds of the repatriation of exiles—a motive prevalent both in the *Hellenica* and the *Encomium* on Agesilaus. In the latter case, the reference to a moral category such as *philetairia* arguably seems to be in accordance with the nature of the genre. Even so, Xenophon himself acknowledges the invalidity of this comradeship motive and concedes “that one may censure these actions [sc. against Phlius and Boeotia] on other grounds” (Xen. *Ages.* 2.21). This is a remarkable statement, since Xenophon, despite the encomiastic genre, concedes that criticism of Agesilaus—“on other grounds”—is somewhat in order.⁶⁵

What other grounds? We have noted Agesilaus’ personal hatred for Thebes, which might be censured as an ignoble motive, especially for a king. There seems to be more. Xenophon’s criticism alludes rather to the actual effects of Agesilaus’ politics than to individual motives. The decade before Leuctra was a period of Spartan setbacks in northern and central Greece, resulting from unscrupulous action supposedly on behalf of the Common Peace. Xenophon, well aware of this, describes the development only succinctly, stating that “the following years [after 377] brought a series of troubles (σφάλματα).” He continues, however, “It cannot be said that they were incurred under the leadership of Agesilaus” (Xen. *Ages.* 2.23). The actual grounds on which one might censure Agesilaus’ actions are thus left unspoken, and Xenophon explicitly excludes the possibility that the troubles of the 370s had anything to do with this. In other words, there was trouble, but Agesilaus was not guilty—and there were grounds on which his hero might be censured, but they are altogether disguised.

To understand this method fully, our investigation must return to the Peace of 371. At the height of the discourse on autonomy in *Hellenica* 5–6, a certain Prothous is introduced—usually thought to play the mere part of a “Herodotean tragic warner”⁶⁶—who argues, albeit in purely theoretical terms, in favor of a revised autonomy policy. Prothous suggests that the assembly demobilize Spartan troops and send embassies to the Greek cities to ask for voluntary contributions to the temple of Apollo in Delphi; and if some infringement of autonomy appeared to occur, to summon those who wished to react and attack the guilty state (*Hell.* 6.4.2). Far from being ironic, Prothous was making an effort to bridge the juridical gap that had been left open since the establishment of the Koine Eirene in 386, by applying a clear-cut and unambiguous definition to *autonomia*. If this were established, Sparta would gain new political ground, and would accordingly overcome the political isolation into which she had been driven by abusing the autonomy clause of the Peace.⁶⁷ Yet the assembly, dominated by Prothous’ opponents, “thought that he was talking rubbish” and ordered Cle-

65. Cf. esp. Tuplin 1993, 84.

66. Dillery 1995, pp. 246, 296, n. 20 (also on speculations about Prothous’ identity); on Herodotean traces in the *Hellenica*, *ibidem*; Hornblower 1994, 30–31.

67. See Jehne 1994, 273–76. Tuplin (1993, 134) detects another subtle message in Prothous’ proposal (combining *Hell.* 6.4.2 and 6.3.20) and concludes that “Prothoos was making what was perhaps an ironic, even sarcastic, suggestion that there was a better way of making money for Apollo if that is what the people really wanted to do.” I doubt that anyone would have understood this joke.

ombrotus to lead his army against Thebes (*Hell.* 6.4.3). One important piece of information omitted in Xenophon's account is supplemented by Plutarch, namely, that the main opponent of Prothous was Agesilaus (Plut. *Ages.* 28).⁶⁸

Xenophon's treatment of Agesilaus is an odd matter. The sources virtually *unisono* identify the king as the prime mover of Spartan war policy,⁶⁹ including the wars against the federal states of Boeotia and Arcadia, and against the Chalcidic League. His motives are reduced to *Machtpolitik*, based on the claim for *autonomia*. Xenophon still makes every last effort to exonerate his hero from the suspicion of being the protagonist of an "anti-federal" policy. Agesilaus—a thoroughly "good man" (Xen. *Ages.* 1.1)—is not burdened with the slightest bit of responsibility. This method makes sense only if Xenophon was aware—as he was—that Agesilaus' unscrupulous dealing with *autonomia* could be challenged as troublesome, not to say disastrous. He concedes that this was the view of a party in Sparta that opposed Agesilaus on the very grounds of his foreign policy (*Hell.* 5.4.13).⁷⁰ Whether Xenophon does secretly share this criticism—as has been suggested by some scholars—or not,⁷¹ he holds *philetairia* against it. Interestingly enough, when defending his hero, Xenophon refrains from arguing that federal states violated the *autonomia* of their members. Autonomy was an ambiguous case, and speculations on the compatibility of autonomy and federalism were "rubbish" anyway. The more reasonable (and more persuasive) argument was *philetairia*.

IV

What was Xenophon's understanding and appraisal of federalism? Any investigation of this question has to balance omission and oddity on the one hand and the good deal of positive information on federalism on the other. The latter comprises two categories of information: Xenophon's general presentation of federalism and his views on *autonomia*, both closely related.

Xenophon considered federal states such as the Achaean and Acarnanian Leagues as common political organizations. There is nothing throughout the narrative history of the *Hellenica* to suggest that he disapproved of federalism as an extraordinary form of the Greek state;⁷² unlike in Thucydides, there is not a single hint that federal states were politically backward or inferior to the polis (Thuc. 1.5.2–3, 3.94.4). Beyond this *argumentum*

68. Cf. Cawkwell 1976, 65: "a tell-tale silence."

69. Cf. Cartledge 1987, 417–18.

70. Cf. Smith 1953/54, 274–88.

71. Dillery (1995, 6) and Tuplin (1993, 163–64) hold that Agesilaus became the focus of Xenophon's critique of Sparta's failure in the years after 386. I do see spots of criticism of Agesilaus' generalship, e.g., for his requiring 20 months to subdue Phlius (*Hell.* 5.3.25) or for his achieving virtually nothing on his campaign against Acarnania (*Hell.* 4.6.13), as well as of his treatment of domestic affairs (Tuplin [1993, 164] gives examples). Yet, this critique is put forward either by the party opposing Agesilaus or by disaffected allies. Xenophon was aware that critique of his champion was too prominent to be discarded (explicitly *Ages.* 2.21). I would rather think that he chose to refer to these issues (cf. *Hell.* 5.3.16, 4.13) and to argue against them, instead of actually sharing in the views of Agesilaus' opponents.

72. See especially *Hell.* 4.6.1–7.1, which is dominated by federal states.

e silentio, Xenophon's narrative indicates that he realized the actual functioning and the attraction of federal arrangements—beyond military necessities. Federalism was of a different quality from *symmachiiai*. His detailed account of the Chalcidic League reveals the conviction that the citizens of a federal union profit from common trade and private rights throughout the cities of the league, as a result of which their union was to become even closer.

Economy is one thing, political power another. According to Xenophon, the very core of a federal state is federal citizenship (esp. *Hell.* 5.2.12). New members were adopted by being awarded this privilege, which indicates that the common citizenship is also the engine of federal expansion. Xenophon took the view that there was nothing remarkable about this. He relates the process rather casually, when referring to the Achaeans, who “were in possession of the formerly Aetolian city Calydon and who had made the people of Calydon Achaean citizens” (*Hell.* 4.6.1).⁷³ In terms of political practice, this foreshadows the success of federalism in the Hellenistic age. In terms of political theory, it is a first step towards overcoming the intellectual boundaries of polis particularism.

But what about political power? This aspect is crucial for federalism, since it concerns the vexed problem of delegating governmental competences from one political entity to another (and vice versa). The principle of vertical diversion of power is well attested in Xenophon, as the passages on the Arcadian and Chalcidic Leagues indicate. In Cleigenes' speech the focus is on the fact that the Chalcidians were offering some sort of participation in the federal government to new members of the league, and were thereby extending the political scope of their member-states. In the passage on the Arcadian League the topic is addressed with regard to the restrictions of genuine political rights of a polis in a federal state. The Arcadian federalists proclaimed that the politics and laws of the single polis were to be subordinate to the federal government and that whatever was decided in the *koinon* was to be binding on its members. Xenophon here grasps two sets of authorities in a federal state, with the federal power being superior to the political competence of the member-cities. This is clearly a milestone in the early history of federalism.

At the same time Xenophon's narrative reveals a contradiction between the federal principle and polis autonomy. Opponents of federalism—Xenophon is canonical about this—never tire of arguing that they desire to live under “the laws of the fathers.” They refuse to delegate genuine political rights of their polis to a superior government—an understandable demand on the (etymo-)logical grounds of *autonomia*. Since “anti-federalists” were able to support their point by alluding to moral categories and traditional values, their arguments for *autopoliteia* were even more conclusive. Given the prominence of *autonomia* in his political thought, it is sensible to assume that Xenophon was on the side of these “anti-federalists.” This does

73. οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ ἔχοντες Καλυδῶνα, ἥ τὸ παλαιὸν Αἰτωλίας ἦν, καὶ πολῖταις πεπονημένοι τοὺς Καλυδωνίους; cf. Merker 1989, 303–4.

not mean that he was hostile to federalism in general—it is difficult to see how he could have been hostile to what he regarded as an ordinary form of Greek government. Xenophon rather disapproved of political orders that, in his eyes, violated the ideal of *autonomia*.

With the establishment of *autonomia* as a political instrument in 386, Greek interstate relations were increasingly affected by a growing tension between *autonomia* and federalism. Paradoxically, there was no unambiguous stipulation of *autonomia*, which also meant that there was no legal definition of the status of autonomy of poleis in a federal state. The practical outcome of this is well known. It is enough to recall that the major battles in Xenophon's times, Leuctra and Mantinea, were fought because of this very tension, and that this had been somewhat anticipated in the battle of Coronea (394), with Orchomenus fighting for her *autonomia* against the federal forces of Boeotia.⁷⁴

We have observed a hidden agenda in Xenophon's narrative on these events. The composition of Books 5–6 brings to light Xenophon's deep disaffection with Sparta's concept of *autonomia*—a view that is corroborated by his apologetic treatment of Agesilaus throughout these affairs. This method of criticizing the Spartans and at the same time absolving Agesilaus from unscrupulous action also sheds some light on Xenophon's difficulties when conceptualizing the federal principle: Xenophon was aware that Agesilaus' policy on *autonomia* proved to be disadvantageous to Sparta, since it damaged Sparta's credibility as *prostates* of the Koine Eirene. Yet, in general terms, Xenophon considered action on behalf of the autonomy clause both necessary and desirable, as long as there was an *actual violation* of the terms of the King's Peace.

But where was the line to be drawn between justified intervention and overambitious action? On the extreme ends, Xenophon leaves no doubt as to what was just and what was not: The campaign against Olynthus and the Chalcidic League was a justified intervention on behalf of *autonomia*, as was the dissolution of the Boeotian League in 386, while the assault on the Theban *Kadmeia* was a violation of *autonomia* by the Spartans. Between these extreme ends, there is a range of (odd) instances in the *Hellenica*, notably the campaigns against the renaissance of the Boeotian League in 378 and against the *Arkadikon*, in which Xenophon refrains from an assessment of whether Agesilaus' treatment of federal states was legitimate or not. He avoids taking a stand on *autonomia* and instead turns to *philetairia*, evidently because this was more plausible. Given the unsolved problem of autonomy in a federal state, it was better to present the reader with noble motives such as the repatriation of exiles rather than with ambiguous concepts like *autonomia*.

Pronouncing "the best interest of the polis" as determinative of whether actions on behalf of the autonomy clause are justified or not, Agesilaus not only ignored juristic criteria of *autonomia*, but also contributed to the gradual process of undermining these criteria: despite several attempts to put the

74. Hamilton 1979, 225–26; Funke 1980, 79–81; Buck 1994, 46–47.

provisions of the Common Peace into concrete terms when renewing the King's Peace,⁷⁵ *autonomia* paradoxically turned even more into a political slogan, losing consent instead of gaining it.⁷⁶

The problem of compatibility between autonomy and federalism consequently not only remained unsolved, it escalated. Is it mere coincidence that Xenophon, on the eve of Leuctra, for the first time presents a theoretical proposal to bridge the gap between *autonomia* and federalism? Prothous, to be sure, was arguing his case in order to regain Spartan supremacy. If, however, his proposal had been accepted, it would also have been an important step towards a normative provision for *autonomia* and its interaction with federalism. The agenda of the Prothous passage is the intellectual struggle with this dilemma.

In the *Hellenica* two trends collide: federalism and polis particularism. Federalism grew considerably after Thucydides, in terms of its regional spread and its sophistication of political structures. Sympolities such as the Arcadian and Chalcidic Leagues illustrate a remarkable degree of vertical diversification of political power; their efforts to transcend the polis by means of federal integration are important features of Greek political skill. Yet, the polis remained the central concept of Greek political theory. Compared to this, federalism was not (yet) established as a political principle with a theoretical justification on its own. It had no intellectual support in Greek political thought. Xenophon, neither a sharp-minded analyst nor a political theorist, was frankly unable to reconcile what was irreconcilable. It was left to Polybius to decide the issue in favor of federalism.⁷⁷

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75. On this process, see Jehne 1994, chap. 2, *passim*.

76. See above n. 53 on Autocles' views and, most notably, on Epaminondas' demand for the Laconian cities to be autonomous. The message is clear, yet the parallel between Boeotia and Laconia was certainly lacking accuracy: cf. now G. Shipley 1997, 189–281, esp. 201–11, on the perioikic status of Laconian poleis.

77. After this article went to press, the important book by G. A. Lehmann, *Ansätze zu einer Theorie des griechischen Bundesstaates bei Aristoteles und Polybios* (Göttingen, 2001), appeared. For Xenophon, see chap. 2, pp. 15–24.

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